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Abstract
Looking at evolving urban governance andplanning practices in the city of Lahore, Pakistan, the article aims to understand—
from an Evolutionary Governance Theory perspective—to what extent these practices steer paths and modes of service
provision and housing for low‐income residents. With a focus on the endurance and transformations of urban governance
practices and institutions, we first explore the influence of the changing development discourse and the impact it has
had on the (re)configuration of urban governance and housing policies in Lahore. Second, drawing on extensive fieldwork
and empirical data collected between 2012 and 2016, we highlight three vignettes depicting the development of different
housing options for low‐income residents in Lahore, i.e., a government‐steered subsidised housing scheme, a privately
developed ‘pro‐poor’ settlement in the peri‐urban fringe of the city, and residential colonies already—or in the process of
being—regularised. By analysing the relationship between governance frameworks, the establishment of the three types
of settlements and how residents manage to access housing and services there, we demonstrate how purposive deregu‐
lation in governance and policy generates a disconnect between urban normative frameworks (i.e., urban planning tools
and pro‐poor housing policies) and residents’ needs and everyday practices. We argue that this highly political process is
not exclusively path‐dependent but has also allowed the creation of liminal spaces based on agency and collective action
strategies of low‐income residents.
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1. Introduction
When Pakistan was created in 1947, the city of
Lahore typified differentiated urban qualities and socio‐
economic disparities in the planned civil station ver‐
sus indigenous settlements (Qadeer, 1983). The effects
of colonial development such as the morphological
differences between newer districts and older areas
of native habitation, the socio‐spatial segregation, the
exclusionary patterns of housing and service provision,
as well as the British‐Indian urban governance regula‐
tions and institutions, constituted a specific legacy for
post‐colonial Lahore (Alvi, 1997; Malik, 2011). When
about five millionMuslims sought refuge inWest‐Punjab
due to partition politics that resulted in the great‐
est displacement of the 20th century, Punjab’s capital
Lahore bore the brunt of the mass influx, and ever
since, the question of housing provision—especially for
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low‐income residents—has been pertinent and highly
politicised. The current government, for instance, rolled
out the “Naya (New) Pakistan Housing” programme in
2018, promising ‘affordable housing’ for low‐income
populations. Against a current estimated national hous‐
ing backlog of 11 to 12 million housing units—four
million only in urban areas—the “Housing for All”
(sub)programme claims to provide five million hous‐
ing units within a “100 Days Agenda” (Government of
Pakistan, 2018). Similar previous steering attempts to
mitigate the increasing housing backlog have largely
failed. In Lahore, Pakistan’s second‐largest city with
an estimated population of approximately 11.1 mil‐
lion inhabitants in 2017 (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics,
2017), the fast‐paced development of housing schemes
in the peri‐urban fringe has hardly contributed—if at
all over the years—to addressing the housing needs
of low‐income and vulnerable populations (Anjum &
Hameed, 2007).
In this article, we analyse the transforming modes,
practices, and strategies of planning and urban gov‐
ernance in Lahore for pro‐poor housing from an
Evolutionary Governance Theory (EGT) perspective
(Van Assche et al., 2014) that understands gover‐
nance and its constitutive elements as relational and
in constant flux. We focus on how actors and institu‐
tions involved in spatial planning over time have dealt
with, perpetuated and/or undermined path dependen‐
cies, and become entangled through goal‐ and inter‐
dependencies. Although these dependencies can con‐
strain the evolution of planning perspectives over time
and lead to the reproduction of already existing modes
of planning and governance—and their underlyingmech‐
anisms of power and control—we intend to scrutinise to
what extent and under which conditions they become
productive in the sense that they create opportunities
for alternative governance paths.We argue that the com‐
bination of EGT perspectives with access theory is con‐
ceptually fruitful to understand: a) the extent to which
these dependencies ultimately steer modes of access to
housing and service provision for low‐income residents;
and b) if and how path creation might shape modes
of beneficiaries’ agency and collective action strategies
from below.
For evidence, we turn to three steering processes
in pro‐poor urban housing governance: A government‐
initiated subsidised housing scheme, a privately devel‐
oped pro‐poor settlement in the peri‐urban fringe of the
city, and residential colonies in the process of regularisa‐
tion. For each of these case study vignettes, we analyse
how different actor/institution configurations governed
the respective pro‐poor housing scheme and how steer‐
ing affected low‐income families’ ability to obtain houses
and services. The individual governance paths are high‐
lighted for each case study by outlining first the planning
aspiration and steps taken for implementation, followed
by an access mapping (Ribot & Peluso, 2003), i.e., the
analysis ofmechanisms bywhich the supposed beneficia‐
ries are enabled or constrained in sustaining low‐income
housing and services. In a third empirical step, we draw
attention to existing path dependencies, interdependen‐
cies, and mechanisms of non‐linear path creation char‐
acteristic for each case study context. The analysis is
based on extensive qualitative social science research
conducted between 2012 and 2016. The insights from
a synthesis of all three case studies enable us to derive
conclusions regarding the wider effects of steering, i.e.,
whether and how sustained access to low‐income hous‐
ing is ensured and could thus be evaluated as a mean‐
ingful contribution to mitigating the housing crisis for
Lahore’s poor. In the conclusion, we reflect on the
added value of combining EGT and access theory for the
theory and practice/s of steering and for understand‐
ing the politics of low‐income housing provision in and
beyond Pakistan.
2. Bringing Access Theory into EGT to Account for
Power Relations in Governance Analysis
Steering comprises both planning and efforts at
implementation that manifest in governance effects.
We understand governance (paths) as histories of steer‐
ing attempts. As EGT scholars have pointed out previ‐
ously (Beunen et al., 2017), social engineering effects are
most likely to take shape in autocratic or centralised soci‐
eties; yet overall, they are overestimated in particular,
“[i]f on the other hand, localism, individualism and legal‐
ism dominate the governance path, it is unlikely that a
plan doesmuch outside the planner’s office” (VanAssche
et al., 2014, p. 90). The quote hints at the empirical
reality that where no top‐down management enforces
governance visions, they fail in practice—from the per‐
spective of those governing. However, from an analytical
perspective, non‐linear path creation can be considered
as productive because it has the potential to open spaces
for dissent, innovation and adaptation. Since EGT con‐
ceptual frameworks have largely disregarded power rela‐
tions between governance actors and institutions so far
(Beunen et al., 2015, p. 332), it has remained inconclu‐
sive why steering attempts fail to meet their intentions.
We argue that access theory has an important contribu‐
tion to make in clarifying this relationship.
Access theory locates power in social relations and
ongoing struggles within them (Peluso & Ribot, 2020,
p. 300). These relationships between actors and institu‐
tions or sets of relationships (bundles of powers) consti‐
tute access mechanisms that determine who can ben‐
efit from resources—in our case low‐income housing
and services. Access itself is defined as the ability to
benefit from a certain resource (Peluso & Ribot, 2020;
Ribot & Peluso, 2003) which does not presume own‐
ership or require property rights as a precondition for
benefit. The focus on the ability (to benefit) extends
beyond rights. Mechanisms of access are subsequently
differentiated between rights‐basedmechanisms (based
on the observation or ignorance of law, thus including,
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e.g., ‘illegal’ access through force) vs. structural and rela‐
tional mechanisms that shape how benefits are gained,
controlled, and maintained—possibly facilitated utilising
technology (physical barriers), capital/finances, knowl‐
edge, authority, identity, and social relationships. Access
analysis comprises the identification of access mecha‐
nisms andunderlying power relations in actor/institution
configurations. For our case, the conceptual merger of
both strands of scholarship allows us to investigate to
what extent evolving planning perspectives and gover‐
nance frameworks ultimately shape, constrain, or limit
residents’ ability to access housing and related services.
By combining access theory with selective EGT con‐
cepts (e.g., non‐linear paths and dependencies), we
extend EGT conceptually (Van Assche et al., 2014)
and illustrate how an analysis of governance paths
that accounts for the analysis of power relations that
underly access mechanisms will reveal limits of steering
(Van Assche & Verschraegen, 2008) and social engineer‐
ing. This is based on the premise that power relations
shape governance arrangements, outcomes, and the
evolution of governance itself. EGT research illustrates
that actor/institution configurations and their respec‐
tive planning visions, once established, tend to repro‐
duce themselves (Beunen et al., 2017, p. 102). Planning
perspectives—specific narratives, specific ways of read‐
ing, and managing socio‐spatial realities—tend to rein‐
force their own constructions of reality, existing power
relations, and actor/institution configurations. In doing
so, they create path dependencies i.e., legacies of the
past in different forms that affect governance evolu‐
tion over time, contribute to the rigidity of planning
(Beunen et al., 2015; Van Assche et al., 2014) and con‐
strain its adaptation to an otherwise changing envi‐
ronment. Strong path dependencies can not only lead
to higher levels of resilience to change but also tend
to foster oversimplified planning perspectives. As path‐
dependent planning, governance frameworks and devel‐
opment discourses can no longer cope with the trans‐
formation of society and the increasing complexity of
urban realities, they might gradually result in a larger dis‐
connect between the perceived problems and suggested
strategies from the planning perspective and the actual
societal needs (Beunen et al., 2017).
The underlying aims and future visions of many plan‐
ning and development interventions are likewise embed‐
ded with goal dependencies. These refer to the shared
visions for the future within a given actor/institution con‐
figuration that contribute to how governance practices
and mechanisms of control, such as plans, policies, and
laws are delineated (Beunen et al., 2015). The more lin‐
ear and homogeneous the vision of the future is—such
as in modernisation paradigm in development theory—
within a given actor/institution configuration, the less
flexible and adaptable the governance frameworkwill be,
and the less able it is to shape non‐linear, alternative cre‐
ative paths to tackle context‐specific and emerging socio‐
spatial challenges.
3. The Evolution of Lahore’s Urban Governance
Framework
The trajectory of pro‐poor housing governance and
related urban steering in Pakistan and specifically
in Lahore has evolved through close entanglements
between development planning at national and sub‐
national levels and international development dis‐
courses (‘fashions’), funding institutions, and consul‐
tancies. The multifarious mutual relations between
international discourses and national steering inten‐
tions in the policy field of housing—besides represent‐
ing de facto goal dependence—have produced specific
actor/institution configurations in Lahore’s pro‐poor
housing sector. From its infancy years, Pakistan’s admin‐
istrations were linked to modernisation theory‐inspired
development planning and related aid disbursements,
e.g., through the “Truman’s Four Point” programme
and the first Five Year Development Plan (1955–60)
prepared by Harvard University academics. In the tra‐
dition of Walter Rostow’s ‘stages of economic growth,’
Ayub Khan’s government (1958–69) emphasised high
industrialist–capitalist development under the tutelage
of a military bureaucracy. While the World Bank and
the government itself viewed the process favourably
and the latter was preparing for grand celebrations of
the ‘decade of development’ in 1968/69, many parts
of the country were in the grip of popular protests
by those who did not benefit from economic growth.
Already in the 1970s–80s, about 75 percent of Lahore’s
population could not afford land at market price (Alvi,
1997; Qadeer, 1983). Large parts of the population could
not afford to own housing and had to resort to rent‐
ing options, adding progressively to existing housing to
host new family members or encroaching on state land.
The authorities either demolished or ignored irregular
housing, locally referred to as katchi abadis, for many
years. The large proportion of the urban and rural pop‐
ulation that depended on irregular housing formed a
veritable political constituency, increasingly able to for‐
mulate political demands. These resonated initially with
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s leftist party in the 1970s, which won
elections with the prospect of granting the poorest hous‐
ing and ownership rights, captured in the slogan “Roti,
Kapra aur Makan” (“Bread, Cloth and Shelter”). Even
though the success of the Bhutto government (1971–77)
in addressing the housing questionwas limited, the politi‐
cisation of the issuemobilised the urban poor around the
cause of urban housing and the subject of katchi abadis
so that all political parties included housing as a subject
in their election manifesto by 1977 (Alvi, 1997).
In this context, the Lahore Urban Development and
Traffic Study 1980 (LUDTS, 1981–2000) was compiled
as a “structure plan” (Javed & Riaz, 2020, p. 155) with
an inherent focus on providing access to services and
supporting informal housing for low‐income groups. In
line with the development paradigm at that time, the
LUDTS focused on the neighbourhood (mohalla) level,
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mirroring the international trend to prioritise structural
plans and action planning approaches (Jenkins et al.,
2007). As it attributed a decisive role to local level plan‐
ning and implementation—in this case, the successor
authority of the colonial Lahore Improvement Trust that
was revamped as Lahore Development Authority (LDA)
in 1975—it also incorporated the World Bank’s focus
on homeownership and security of tenure in land and
housing for the urban poor. In addition, other ‘travel‐
ling ideas,’ rooted in the basic needs and redistribution
of growth development theories of the 1970s (Jenkins
et al., 2007; Qadeer, 1983, p. 255), manifested in aided
self‐help housing programmes and progressive develop‐
ment strategies (such as ‘sites and services’).
The military government of Zia‐ul‐Haq (1978–88)
addressed the issue of access to low‐income housing
in the 1981 National Housing Policy (NHP) and the
establishment of provincial Katchi Abadis Directorates
financed by loans of Structural Adjustment Programmes
(Gera, 2007). The “One Million Houses” programme
that promised to construct 1.5 million housing units by
1993, projecting to have the first 300,000 units ready
by 1988, i.e., within two years (Alvi, 1997, pp. 74–75),
remained far behind expectations with just about 35,000
units constructed. Subsequent public sector initiatives
for pro‐poor housing schemes followed this precedent
(Rana, 2013). Until the late 1990s, master plans and
housing and development programmes rolled out in
Pakistan and Lahore in particular failed to address the
housing problem for low‐income populations. Regularly,
ambitious public sector pro‐poor housing programmes,
aligned with international aid and development funding
lines, were announced as flagships of newly established
governments, then delayed and ultimately abandoned
with the coming of a new administration. An insufficient
allocation of funds for low‐income housing and services
among development authorities and local governments
hindered implementation. Moreover, early subsidised
sites and services programmes in Lahore in the 1950s
(e.g., in Samanabad and Gulberg) simply lacked a pro‐
poor focus or experienced gentrification (Alvi, 1997,
p. 57; Qadeer, 1983). Consequently, planning scholars
and practitioners in Pakistan eagerly picked up the turn
to an affordability approach to low‐income housing,
which was also promoted by the World Bank (Ahsan,
2019; Fariha et al., 2018). This paradigm shift ascribed
the private sector the central role for housing devel‐
opment. Accordingly, the NHP‐2001 merely established
guidelines for developing provincial housing policies and
the coordination between federal, provincial and urban
local bodies, but de facto had little impact on low‐income
housing planning. Recently, the global trend of corporati‐
sation was accounted for in Lahore when public sector
companies owned by the provincial government or its
public sector departments entered themarket to provide
public utilities and consultancy services.
Although the effort to comply with the Millennium
Development Goals on urban poverty reduction and
slum improvement can be traced in the NHP‐2001 and
the later Task Force Report on Urban Development 2011,
on the provincial level, it has mainly translated into reg‐
ularisation programmes for informal settlements (katchi
abadis). After their initiation under Bhutto’s government,
subsequent alternating civilian andmilitary governments
continued with the regularisation of katchi abadis as
their main and most resilient government strategy for
low‐income housing. With an inherent property rights
approach (de Soto, 2001), however, these policies raise
questions about their effectiveness in improving access
to housing and adequate services for low‐incomeand vul‐
nerable populations.
The evolution of the urban governance framework
and the urban planning regulatory instruments and
institutions has followed a non‐linear transformation
process, in which interdependencies, gaps, overlaps,
and failures characterise actor/institution configurations.
Even the devolution of powers to the provincial level
from 2010 onwards has not eased fragmented plan‐
ning. Local urban governance has evolved, closely inter‐
linked with Local Government Acts of the day, which
time and again reshaped administrative boundaries
and institutional‐jurisdictional mandates with each new
incoming government. Actor/institution configurations
operating under the Ministry of Defence blurred the
urban governance framework further (Cermeño, 2021).
As a result, a myriad of governing bodies responsible
for planning and implementation coexist. The largest
one, the LDA—an autonomous body under the provin‐
cial Secretary of Housing Urban Development & Public
Health Engineering Department (HUD&PHE)—covered
the Lahore Metropolitan Area, approximately 1,760
square kilometres in the 1980s, and gradually expanded
to around 2,306 square kilometres in 1988, before
it expanded further to include four districts: Lahore,
Sheikhupura, Nankana Sahib, and Kasur in 2013 (Javed
& Riaz, 2020). In contrast, the Punjab Housing and Town
Planning Agency, also under the HUD&PHE, is responsi‐
ble for the overall spatial planning in Punjab Province,
the implementation of the NHP, and the development of
social housing projects on public land, such as the cur‐
rent government’s “Naya Pakistan Housing” programme.
4. Evolution and Path Creation in Three Pro‐Poor
Housing Projects
In the following, we will investigate three vignettes
as examples of pro‐poor urban housing governance
projects: A government‐initiated subsidised housing
scheme, a privately developed incremental pro‐poor set‐
tlement, and informal residential areas under regular‐
isation. We conducted qualitative research in all sites
discontinuously between 2012 and 2016 as part of two
larger research projects on: (1) social mobilisation pro‐
cesses in peri‐urban low‐income areas of Pakistan; and
(2) access to housing and services in the neighbouring
cities of Amritsar and Lahore, across the India‐Pakistan
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border. Recurrent field research periods in Lahore lasted
on average three to four months and covered the
time before and after the elections in Punjab province,
enabling us to locate the development processes in the
three sites in the broader political context. General elec‐
tions in Pakistan were held on 11 May 2013. As a result,
Pakistan Muslim League‐Nawaz (PML‐N) became the
first party in the federal government with Nawaz Sharif
as Prime Minister. In Punjab, the PML‐N provincial gov‐
ernmentwas re‐electedwithMuhammad Shahbaz Sharif
as Chief Minister of Punjab.
In all three sites, we employed ethnographic field‐
work methods, including informal and in‐depth inter‐
views of residents and staff members of the differ‐
ent agencies and companies involved in governance to
explore the effect of steering, namely whether and how
access to low‐income housing is gained, controlled, and
maintained. We conducted follow‐up interviews with
key respondents over the years, which allowed a bet‐
ter understanding of the evolution of governance in
the studied housing projects. These methods were com‐
plemented by walk‐alongs—a combination of selective
participant observation with informal interviews with
residents in the respective field sites. Our analysis is,
therefore, based on observations and interviews gath‐
ered as ethnographic fieldnotes, as well as additional
documentary materials (e.g., evolving housing policies
and regulations, local and national newspaper clips,
beneficiaries’ allotment letters and payments slips, offi‐
cial newsletters, brochures or reports on the housing
projects, among others).
4.1. Case I—Ashiana: A Public Pro‐Poor Housing Scheme
Ashiana‐e‐Quaid Lahore is the name of a pro‐poor hous‐
ing scheme initiated inMarch 2011 by the Punjab provin‐
cial government in Lahore. The project was assigned
to the Punjab Land Development Company (PLDC) and
aimed to provide roughly 2,750 affordable housing units
for low‐income and vulnerable beneficiaries. PLDC had
been set up in 2010 with a specific pro‐poor housing
mandate by the provincial government (PLDC, 2011;
Saeed, 2013) even though entities with similar man‐
dates already existed. Under the direct supervision of
the Chief Minister of Punjab, Ashiana received not only
land transferred to PDLC but also direct seed funding
from the Punjab Government (Ur Rahmaan, 2017). With
the land subsidised, low‐income residents were to cover
the cost of the house only. A bilateral financial agree‐
ment between PLDC and the Bank of Punjab (BOP) facil‐
itated access to loans for successful allottees (PLDC,
2012). After the first keys were handed over to resi‐
dents in late December 2011, the inauguration of the
second phase in Ashiana‐e‐Quaid followed in February
2012, and a new low‐income scheme with 10,000 flats—
Ashiana‐e‐Iqbal—was launched by PLDC (2012) in coop‐
eration with the LDA preceding elections in 2013. By this
time, the ChiefMinister of Punjab also acted as LDA chair‐
man (Provincial Assembly of the Punjab, 2013). After
his party (PML‐N) won the elections, the speed of work
almost froze while Ashiana transformed into a public–
private enterprise as PLDC and LDA partnered with con‐
struction companies (e.g., NESPAK, Bahria Town) and
investors for the scheme’s development (LDA, 2015).
By March 2016, about one‐third of the initially planned
low‐income houses were still to start construction, while
manymore remained either unfinished or under the con‐
trol of the constructors despite previous allotment.
To be selected, eligible candidates—those with an
individual income below Rs. 20,000 (Kahloon, 2011, p. 4;
PLDC, 2011, p. 43), Rs. 30,000 per household (interview
with PLDC officer, December 6, 2014), or with proof of
belonging to a specific quota—were included in a lottery
draw for provisional allotment letters in August 2011.
However, for some potential beneficiaries, the necessary
25 percent down payment for the house was too high
despite BOP loan provisions. Furthermore, residents indi‐
cated that monthly instalments increased by one‐third
as they had to pay interests to the BOP in the pro‐
cess (interviews, December 8, 2014). Months after first
allottees had moved in, construction remained incom‐
plete, and developers lagged behind with the provision
of basic facilities such as water from overhead reser‐
voirs. Instead, water trucks were organised to fill indi‐
vidual houses’ water tanks (interviews, May 6, 2012)
until water was provided on a regular basis. In conse‐
quence,many residents denied paying service charges to
what they suspectedwere fake PLDC employees because
they had heard an announcement by the Chief Minister
that no service fees would be required until the entire
scheme was fully developed (interviews with residents,
November 29 andDecember 6, 2014). However, the slow
pace of completion in Ashiana‐e‐Quaid hindered many
allottees from accessing their houses, even though they
had paid the down payments. Others who had not, but
lost interest in the rights‐based access to allotted houses,
stopped paying instalments, which reportedly affected
the funding sources of the PLDC. PLDC subsequently
attracted affluent buyers ready to take over the liabili‐
ties of low‐income defaulters at negotiated prices close
to market value. In another contradiction to the set‐out
principles for Ashiana’s development, PLDC sold and
rented informally (interviews with residents, December
6 and 8, 2014). Residents who had moved to Ashiana
in 2015 noted that their connections with politicians or
influential people enabled them, for example, to trade
an allotment letter of a house with a specific number
in a specific block that was yet to be completed against
another allotment letter in an already finished sector
(interviews, September 23, 2015).
The scheme’s failure to provide pro‐poor housing
solutions originates in deeply engrained dependen‐
cies of the governance actor/institution configuration,
related power dynamics, and underlying planning visions.
The strategic mobilisation of the pro‐poor housing
discourse before the 2013 elections as a top‐down,
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fast‐track, low‐cost housing vision caused fast‐paced
steering, including early implementation in 2011–12.
The LDA/PLDC tandem demonstrated a dominant path‐
dependent position of provincial development actors
in the urban governance framework to the detriment
of (lower‐tier) local governance institutions. Despite
subsidies, the adverse purchasing arrangements for
low‐income families led to the exclusion of eligible appli‐
cants. The disconnect between the market‐driven cor‐
poratisation, manifest in the interdependence between
LDA/PLDC, and construction companies owned by polit‐
ically influential persons (Dawn, 2016; Siddiqa, 2007)
on the one hand, and the slow pace of construction
and transfer of completed houses to beneficiaries on
the other, points to informal mechanisms of purpo‐
sive deregulation guided by profit‐interests of the actors
involved. The leadership of PLDC, together with BOP and
Bahria, as well as other contractors, strategically calcu‐
lated the loss of government property and the benefits
of turning Ashiana into amiddle‐class neighbourhood up
for purchase on the open housing market. This allowed
exploiting the gap between the real estate value on‐site
(subsidised due to free land allocation) and the market
value that middle‐income clients pay in comparable loca‐
tions where the land plot costs more than the construc‐
tion of the house. However, allottees practised purpo‐
sive deregulation, too, when they increasingly perceived
allotment arrangements as insecure and denied pay‐
ment of fees and further instalments. The discretionary
decisions and transfers to allottees without a house, in
spite of submitted down payments, led to access fail‐
ure rather than enforcing allottees’ rights. Subsequently,
they chose access paths through relational mechanisms
to realise their rights by investing in relations with politi‐
cians and PLDC representatives to secure or maintain
access to housing and services.
4.2. CASE II—KKB‐Lahore: Sites and Services Approach
Khuda Ki Basti Lahore (KKB‐L) is the name of a repli‐
cated Incremental Housing Scheme (IHS) initiated first
by the Pakistani NGO Saiban in Hyderabad Sindh (KKB‐1)
from 1986 onwards. The founder and chairman of Saiban
refers to it as an experiment (Siddiqui, 2014) for pro‐
viding affordable housing to the urban poor, develop‐
ing infrastructures on a progressive self‐financing model
(based on instalments and development charges paid by
residents), and for enabling low‐income groups, gener‐
ally excluded from the formal housing market, to access
small loans. This IHS approach was initially inspired by
the Latin American‐origin sites and services schemes
(Turner, 1977) that came to be promoted globally by the
World Bank from the 1970s onwards.
KKB‐L was launched in 2005/06 in the northern
periphery of Lahore beyond the River Ravi. One major
reason for this remote location was that unlike for
KKB‐1, where the Hyderabad Development Authority
provided the land at subsidised rates, Saiban had to pur‐
chase the land for KKB‐L from private owners at market
value. Accordingly, KKB‐L was planned on a very small
scale, limited to eight hectares for 460 plots. A plot for
low‐income residents was to cost Rs. 90,000. The author‐
ities approved the plan in exchange for a certain num‐
ber of mortgaged plots, and since the land was pur‐
chased with the help of a Rs. 10 million loan, premium
location plots for Rs. 125,000 apiece were integrated in
the planning. Potential residents who did not own prop‐
erty already, had a maximum income of Rs. 15,000 and
agreed to construct a house and inhabit it for aminimum
of five years were accepted as allottees. Given that the
plot price was already beyond the means of many, the
expenses for constructing the house was the main fac‐
tor deterring potential settlers, besides issues like the
distance to urban Lahore and lack of transport from the
settlement to the main road. To counter this, Saiban
accepted 25percent of the cost of the land as a downpay‐
ment and the rest in monthly instalments. Of those resi‐
dents who acquired a Rs. 200,000 loan from the Housing
Building Finance Corporation for the construction of the
house, many, however, opted to construct minimal struc‐
tures or poor‐quality houses and saved the loan for other
purposes. By 2014, only about 200 of 460 planned plots
were occupied, of which 50 percent remained in default
of payment. Moreover, the small socio‐spatial scale of
KKB‐L inhibited the development of economic activities
in the settlement, thus leaving constructed shops with‐
out leases in the planned commercial sites (interviews,
December 13, 17 and 27, 2014).
Residents’ ability to benefit from infrastructure and
service provision remained limited: Water supply was
not yet centralised and proper roads were still not built
after ten years of development. A portion of the park
was transformed into premium plots, and the commu‐
nity centre laid out in the KKB‐L plan was never con‐
structed. Other services such as schooling, a mosque
and medical care (dispensary) were available selectively.
On the one hand, access to such services depended
on outreach and relations (‘self‐management’) of indi‐
vidual block representatives to NGOs and social wel‐
fare organisations, the mandates of both were limited.
On the other, service provision became linked to identity
traits, community cohesion in housing blocks, and loca‐
tion and time of settlement. For example, the NGO‐run
dispensary and gynaecologist assistance were based on
the work of volunteers and could only offer scattered
service to residents; the financing of the mosque by
donors from a specific Muslim sect excluded the larger
part of the settlement population, and road construc‐
tion was advanced most where residents had settled
down and paid service charges longest. This indicates
struggles between different interest groups among resi‐
dents and Saiban for the control over resources and their
management and points to underlying webs of power
relations. Especially community managers and elected
representatives of block committees aspired to become
brokers in the development process by attempting to
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monopolise access to developmental charges and NGOs’
funds to ultimately control the distribution of bene‐
fits for their own constituencies. Rifts between block
resident populations emerged, for example, because
Pashtuns—who originated fromwestern Pakistan and do
not usually have relatives and family support in Lahore
and its surroundings—had a clear incentive to estab‐
lish themselves a home in KKB‐L in aspiration of social
upward mobility. The decision of many Punjabi families
to move to KKB‐L mostly from Lahore proper, on the con‐
trary, seems to have been motivated primarily by invest‐
ment purposes (interviews, December 17 and 21, 2014;
November 29, 2015).
While the initial conditions under which KKB‐L came
into being triggered strong path dependencies, the inter‐
play of dependencies created unanticipated effects for
Saiban and hampered the development of the housing
scheme. Goal dependencies manifested in the discon‐
nect between the incremental housing discourse that
guided the planning of KKB and the fact that some res‐
idents did not, or could not, share the idea of commu‐
nal self‐financing and stopped paying instalments. Even
where settlers benefitted from Saiban‐facilitated loans
and payment concessions, these access mechanisms
failed to ensure the quality of constructions because of
strategic calculations of residents related to the prospect
of land speculation (access seizure). It is noteworthy that,
despite sanctions, some residents succeeded in acquir‐
ing up to eight plots utilising relatives’ names that in fact
had no intention to move to the settlement; here, ini‐
tial constructions merely happened to prevent the can‐
cellation of the plots (interviews, December 21, 2014).
The low occupation rate and the increase of default‐
ers affected the cost recovery of instalments and the
development of self‐financed services causing residents
to mobilise relational access opportunities within their
immediate community or identity groups or through tap‐
ping NGOs and social welfare organisations for facilities
and service provision. As a result, each residential block
has undergone a different development path based on
specific sets of power relations that manifested in differ‐
ent usages of relational access mechanisms and evolved
from goal dependencies linked to the different moti‐
vations for settling in KKB‐L. Taken together, this case
exemplifies a failed steering attempt that largely over‐
estimated the ability and willingness of low‐income res‐
idents to construct and consolidate housing and ser‐
vices on their own. As a result, different urban qualities
evolved within the settlement.
4.3. CASE III—Inchoate Regularisation of Katchi Abadis
on Federal Land (Pakistan Railways)
Mughalpura is the name of an area in Lahore that
historically consists of land from the British‐Indian
North Western State Railway and, after 1947, of
the Pakistan Government Railway Transport Company
(Pakistan Railways). Refugees arriving from India in 1947
established several irregular colonies (katchi abadi/s) on
the vacant land starting from encroachments and make‐
shift constructions, e.g., Al‐Noor Colony, Miraj Colony,
Jamilabad, and Dars Bare Mian. Pakistan Railways have
tried to evict irregular settlers from its land since the
1950s. Only under Zia‐ul‐Haq’s military government
(1978–88), an initial form of regularisation came into
effect, entitling katchi abadi dwellers who could prove
residence from 1 January 1978 to ownership rights
and a subsequent legalisation of status (Government of
Punjab, 1987). After a Punjab government survey iden‐
tified 34 katchi abadis on Railways’ land in 1986, these
sites were registered for transferral from the Ministry of
Railways to provincial jurisdiction for planned regulari‐
sation. Without waiting for the necessary non‐objection
certificates (NOCs), LDA reportedly started to implement
development measures and charged service fees and
property tax while the transfer of rights was delayed.
Even after the provincial government issued the Punjab
Katchi Abadis Act 1992 (Government of Punjab, 1992)
that newly enacted a 1985 cut‐off date, and provided
that only the Directorate General (DG) Katchi Abadis
Punjab (created in 1987) would have the power to carry
out evictions, the RailwayMinistry continued to schedule
demolitions. During the military government of Pervez
Musharraf (1999–2007), the government of Punjab
issued a protection order in 2001 to halt demolitions
and evictions unless clearance was obtained from the
District Coordination &Monitoring Committee on Katchi
Abadis (Government of Punjab, 2001). Furthermore,
dwellers were to be compensated in case of neces‐
sary relocation. Despite the recognition of katchi abadis
as legitimate in the NHP of 2001 and the issuance
of the Punjab Katchi Abadis (Amendment) Ordinance
2007 (Government of Punjab, 2007)—enacted later as
the Punjab Katchi Abadis (Amendment) Act 2009—that
determined the cut‐off date 31 December 2006, the
reluctance of Railways officials to issue NOCs for LDA
and thus to effectively cede land to katchi abadi dwellers
remained high. Eviction notices were issued continu‐
ously in 2011 and 2012. By early 2012, 36 katchi abadis
throughout Lahore were still waiting for NOCs from the
Railways. This number included 24 of the 34 that existed
before 1985 (interviews, February 28, 2012).
The dwellers of the different katchi abadis in
Mughalpura secured access illegally when they first
settled on vacant government land. With eviction
notices against them and government interventions in
their favour, residents navigated steering attempts and
increasingly became confident to rely on their own
actions in the local governance set‐up. For example,
when Pakistan Railways targeted Al‐Noor and few other
colonies in 2000, they mobilised widespread protests
based on the collective action infrastructure of the newly
founded All Pakistan Katchi Abadi Alliance (APKAA) and
the Lahore‐wide Muttahida Action Committee that had
existed as a wing of the Social Welfare Society Dars
Bare Mian Mughalpura since its registration in 1983 and
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whose presidentwas born inDars BareMian Katchi Abadi
as a son of refugees from India. In 2001, APKAA peti‐
tioned the government to complete the regularisation
of katchi abadis, including the transfer of rights and
the implementation of development works, and to put
a stop to the Railways’ demolition attempts. However,
while the share of transferred land in Dars Bare Mian
Katchi Abadi amounted to 193,000 square metres of
a total of 280,500 square metres by 2014 (Salahuddin,
2014), only 250 out of the 3,500 houses were regis‐
tered and had attained the legal title. The reason was
twofold: Hardly any family could pay the amount of
money DG Katchi Abadi staff reportedly requested ille‐
gally for titling (Rs. 30,000), and subsequently, residents
settled for transfer notification as good‐enough tenure
security. At the same time, residents’ access to services
(water, electricity, gas) and infrastructure expanded con‐
tinuously. With an estimated population of more than
200,000 residents, Mughalpura has regularly had can‐
didates for the National and Provincial Assembly elec‐
tions line up to pave streets and lanes, finance sewerage
systems and erect schools to secure votes (interviews:
April 13 and 21, 2012).
This case of pro‐poor housing governance did not
originate in comprehensive plans but exemplifies respon‐
sive steering due to large‐scale illegal encroachment
on government land. Poor settlers were able to main‐
tain their ability to live on that land through three
types of relational access mechanisms: Paying rents to
Railways employees, lobbying the government through
resistance activities to enact regularisation policies, and
serving as vote banks for candidates in political elec‐
tions in exchange for infrastructure and service develop‐
ment that conversely aided dwellers’ access claims. Even
though the protests of Railways’ katchi abadi dwellers
succeeded—especially with the military governments
under Zia‐ul‐Haq and Musharraf—thus forging a kind
of goal dependency with the joint aim at regularisa‐
tion, the policies were not enforced, and residents never
gained access control. Incentives for adverse power rela‐
tions prevailed; especially the increase of real estate
prices during the property boom of the 2000s incen‐
tivised Pakistan Railways employees to urge evictions
and lease out land illegally to interested tenants for per‐
sonal benefit rather than to have it transferred to LDA
for regularisation. Even where land was transferred and
title deeds were issued, Railways officials still exercised
control through racketeering, i.e., by enforcing fees for
any action (extensions, titling, repairs) related to indi‐
vidual houses. This does not only subject katchi abadi
dwellers’ full tenure security to uncertainty and under‐
mines state policy but also fails to provide sustainable
pro‐poor housing.
5. Discussion
In each of the three case studies, a unique combina‐
tion of path dependencies, interdependencies, and
goal dependencies constituted governance paths and
their linear and non‐linear specific manifestations.
We detected that the different phases and compo‐
nents of steering corresponded with the prevalence
of certain forms of dependencies. In a planning stage,
actor/institution configurations presented themselves
as highly path‐dependent, and the development of local
visions for pro‐poor housing schemes in close relation
with international discourses constituted an indicator of
goal dependency. It dominated the translation of vision
into strategy in a second phase.While thus path and goal
dependencies structured the framework for pro‐poor
housing policy implementation, this crucial phase was
characterised by the interplay of power relations—actors
negotiating the enforcement of their interests—that
manifested in numerous interdependencies. These were
mainly responsible for steering outcomes and the extent
to which non‐linear governance paths evolved. However,
all three types of dependencies amplified each other and
determined the outcome of steering attempts.
Modes of access to low‐income housing in all three
cases were determined by strong path dependencies
linked to the initial conditions in which the respective
project was set. We found path dependencies in Ashiana
in the institutional LDA/PLDC tandem overriding local
government structures, a mechanism manifest in the
evolution of Lahore’s urban governance frameworks,
where government institutions are entangled atmultiple
levels and paths of governance simultaneously. The role
of the PLDC in Ashiana’s actor/institution configuration,
the trend towards corporatisation in goal‐dependent
alignment with the latest development discourse, and
subsequently evolved market‐driven motivations for the
development of the scheme plus profit interests of
individuals tangible in speculative strategies, all per‐
petuated the path dependency. In effect, the steering
of pro‐poor public housing sector activities derailed.
Similarly, in the KKB‐L case, goal dependencies manifest
in the disconnect between the IHS’s ‘travelling idea’ and
the beneficiaries of the communal self‐funding model’s
lack of endorsement limited the target groups’ ability
to gain and maintain houses and services. The case
showed, too, that actors, once established in a specific
actor/institution configuration within a highly depen‐
dent governance path, found it difficult to alter the
direction of governance. When they attempted to do so
through informal beneficiary‐targeted deregulation via
concessions, they produced further dependencies, for
example a larger number of defaulters. In the case of
katchi abadi colonies, employees of Pakistan Railways
(a powerful federal institution with an asset range
of land and properties inherited from colonial times)
constrained residents’ ability to secure access control
of housing despite government efforts of ‘responsive
steering’ to regularise low‐income informal settlements.
The very idea underlying those regularisations can be
considered goal dependent, as different governments,
civilian and military alike, have aligned, uncritically, to
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the international discourse of granting property rights
(de Soto, 2001) to the urban poor—with the assumption
that rights‐basedmechanism alone would ensure access.
The analysis of access mechanisms at work in the
three case studies enables us to point out interdepen‐
dencies that manifest in power relations underlying the
respective actor/institution configurations. In all three
schemes, rights‐based mechanisms (legal and illegal)
secured access mostly in connection to other mecha‐
nisms. Property rights alone—when available—would
not necessarily translate into full access to services.
Structural and, particularly, relational access mecha‐
nisms proved more influential in enabling or constrain‐
ing low‐income residents’ ability to gain, control or main‐
tain access. In Ashiana, connections to politicians and/or
the urban development agency could expedite hous‐
ing delivery and transfers of allotments. In KKB‐L, res‐
idents could ease the financial effort of purchasing a
plot and building a house through formal and informal
funding arrangements with themanaging NGO. Facilities
and service provision could be lobbied via identity‐
based collective action or by reaching out to NGOs
and welfare organisations. In katchi abadi colonies, res‐
idents maintained their ability to benefit from hous‐
ing and services through informal payments, strategies
of resistance such as intermittent social mobilisation,
and by mobilising their bargaining power as voter bank
with politicians. Adverse power relations or structural
aspects, however, also constrained benefits from the
housing projects and the regularisation programmes.
In Ashiana, unfavourable purchasing arrangements oper‐
ated as powers of exclusion, and the protracted construc‐
tion process—engrained in the entanglements between
urban development actors and their conflicting inter‐
ests and calculations—hampered the delivery of houses.
In KKB‐L, the lack of cohesion undermined the equal
distribution of benefits. In katchi abadis, the threat of
evictions and the strategic pressure tactics by Railways
employees through bribes, intimidation, and coercion
sustained residents’ uncertainty.
The amplifying effect of entangled dependencies in
Ashiana was obvious in linkages between the elections
and the pace of construction—a combination of goal‐,
interdependence, and path dependence. Similarly, KKB‐L
illustrated how the development process was contingent
on the payment of fees and the number of beneficiaries
willing to reside in KKB‐L—and this in return was depen‐
dent on the way the NGO managed (or not) to translate
the idea of incremental housing into practice. Likewise, in
katchi abadis, modes of access were steered by the idea
of granting property rights in combination with interde‐
pendencies between katchi abadi dwellers throughbuild‐
ing alliances for social mobilisation and between resi‐
dents, Railways officers, and development authorities—
i.e., DG Katchi Abadis and LDA. Here it also becomes
evident how an institution such as LDA can be part
of different actor/institution configurations and influ‐
ence different governance paths simultaneously. It also
points to the existence ofmultiple governance paths, the
entanglements of which are of differentiated quality and
extent and non‐linear in nature.
Although failures in all three steering attempts
responded in one way or another to the interplay of
dependencies producing rigidity in the envisioned plans
and their implementation, our analysis revealed an
alternative path creation that proved flexible and pro‐
ductive. Unanticipated effects were particularly domi‐
nant in KKB‐L’s case since the governance path strongly
depended on translating and implementing a largely de‐
contextualised vision—the IHS—into reality. Beneficiary‐
targeted deregulation from above and purposive dereg‐
ulation (by defaulting in payments) from below opened
a space of negotiating evolutionary governance where
access mechanisms continued to be adapted and experi‐
mented, thus leaving scope for innovation and improve‐
ment. In Ashiana, informal arrangements from above in
the allocation of houses also developed and were con‐
sequently countered with purposive deregulation by res‐
idents refusing to pay fees, selling, and renting houses
before legally entitled. However, in this case, the effects
of alternative path creation benefited mostly specific—
well connected—individuals or well‐off bidders and,
therefore, progressively abandoned the goal to provide
pro‐poor housing. In the case of katchi abadi colonies,
the failure of responsive steering—since access control
was never obtained—has shaped spaces of civil dissent,
resistance, negotiation, and cooperation that require
constant re‐mobilisation to secure good‐enough tenure.
6. Conclusion
Actor/institution configurations in Lahore pertaining to
urban governance and specifically low‐income hous‐
ing have changed over time with transforming polit‐
ical economies. Along with this, possibilities, mecha‐
nisms, and strategies to access low‐income housing
and services have also evolved through rights‐based
and structural‐relational access mechanisms. While the
politics of promise by different political regimes in
Pakistan created an environment of optimism and polit‐
ical mobilisation for the urban poor, they also led to
political and bureaucratic appropriation through various
state‐led or ‐supported policies and steering attempts.
The process of negotiating these different interests not
only ‘from below’ and ‘from above’ but also in their
mutual interdependencies and continuing path depen‐
dencies exemplifies what we call the politics of evolving
urban governance.
In this article, we combined access theory with
an evolutionary governance approach to analyse how
steering attempts get derailed and produce non‐linear
governance paths. We have demonstrated how the
attention to power relations between different urban
governance institutions and actors reveals the politics of
access to low‐income housing and services with three
case vignettes from Lahore. Gaining and maintaining
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access was shown to be highly contested among the
stakeholders involved. The failures of low‐income hous‐
ing provision—as well as the mitigation strategies to
counter these—can therefore be conceived as access
struggles, highly political open‐ended processes. Once
opened, alternative governance paths turned out to
be productive for aspiring low‐income property owners
who, for example, employed civil dissent, social mobilisa‐
tion, and strategies of resistance (‘collective action strate‐
gies frombelow’) in the broader sense, and, in this frame‐
work, most meaningfully by pursuing informal mecha‐
nisms of purposive deregulation. These were guided by
profit interests of actor/institution configurations that
discouraged low‐income occupancy and by allottees and
residents’ motivations to gain access even if it meant
to default on formal rules. In our cases, when the
low‐income residents employed relational access mech‐
anisms instead of rights‐based ones, this contributed
to non‐linear path creation with ends even more lose,
seemingly unpredictable, and in effect pushing evolv‐
ing urban governance beyond (stated) initial steering
intentions. This finding frames the emerged disconnect
between urban normative frameworksmanifest in urban
planning visions and pro‐poor housing policies on the
one hand and residents’ needs and everyday practices
on the other. Our insights explain the dismal prospects
for resolving the housing crisis in Lahore and in the wider
context of Pakistan.
Abstracting from the specific case of Lahore and low‐
income urban housing governance in Pakistan, we see
the added value of the theoretical merger of access
theory and EGT in investigating steering failures in
urban governance contexts of other societies—in the
so‐called Global South, Global East, and Global North.
We argue that an EGT‐access approach allows trac‐
ing the mechanisms underlying the processes through
which low‐income populations manage to benefit from
housing and services across culturally or politically spe‐
cific contexts. The attention of planners should also
be directed towards mutually amplifying dependencies
at work. As our cases showed, diverse types of gover‐
nance dependencies and their interplay constrain the
evolution of the planned visions over time, which ulti‐
mately risks leading to the reproduction of existing
actor/institution configurations, unequal mechanisms of
access to housing and services and bundles of powers.
Strong path dependencies need to be balanced with cal‐
culated non‐linearity in path creation to avoid statism
and allow productive flexibility to confront challenges
and regain shared visions of urban futures. In cities of the
Global North, access cum EGT analyses can help to shed
light on gentrification mechanisms that often entail the
dismantling of public housing and/or the uprooting of
low‐income residents from renewed and revalued neigh‐
bourhoods. In urban agglomerations of the Global South
and Global East, these types of analyses can probe fur‐
ther into why different pro‐poor housing projects do not
deliver stated objectives, i.e., access to housing and ser‐
vices for low‐income and vulnerable populations. Last
but not least, the conceptual approach outlined in this
article also provides a lens to capture the productive
dynamics of evolving non‐linear urban governance paths
by taking into account forms of agency and collective
action strategies of low‐income and vulnerable people.
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